Abstract. Fermilab supports a scientific program that includes experiments and scientists located across the globe. In order to better serve this community,
Introduction
.Fermilab is the premier high energy physics laboratory in the United States and supports a scientific program which includes experiments and scientists located across the globe. As one of the founding members of the Open Science Grid (OSG), Fermilab enables coherent access to its production resources through the Grid infrastructure system called FermiGrid. This system successfully provides for centrally managed grid services, opportunistic resource access, development of OSG Interfaces for Fermilab, and an interface to the Fermilab Mass Storage dCache system. FermiGrid support for virtual organizations (VOs) includes high energy physics experiments (USCMS, MINOS, D0, CDF, ILC), astrophysics experiments (SDSS, Auger, DES), biology experiments (GADU, Nanohub) and educational activities.
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User Registration, Authentication and Authorization
The OSG uses The Americas Grid Policy Management Authority (TAGPMA) federation of authorization providers as the base set of trusted certificate authorities (CAs). Additional CAs have been added to FermiGrid systems on a case by case basis. Once a user obtains an X.509 certificate, they register their Distinguished Name (DN) with the VO of which they want to become a member using the Virtual Organization Membership Registration Service (VOMRS) [4] ) and manages the registration workflow. A hierarchy of VO administrators approves the user registration to join groups and VO roles. Users often are members of multiple VOs and assume multiple roles within a VO. If plain grid certificates are used, that is, certificates without extended key attributes (group, role, …), a user would have to maintain individual certificates for each VO, group, and role combination. For users with many VO/group/role combinations, this can become an overly burdensome task. The infrastructure uses extended X.509 certificates to encode VO, groups and group role membership [6] . This allows a user to own a single certificate and belong to multiple VOs.
VOMRS pushes the user's DN and the VO extended attributes to the appropriate VOMS server, where they are stored. After this synchronization has completed, the user can generate a grid proxy with extended key attributes, also known as a VOMS proxy certificate, using voms-proxy-init (e.g., voms-proxy-init -voms fermilab:/fermilab/usminos/Role=softadmin).
Most, if not all, TAGPMA member CAs issue user grid certificates with a lifetime of one year, and a user can obtain a proxy certificate for up to the lifetime of the user certificate. This is not recommended for security reasons since the user's proxy certificate, by default, resides in /tmp for the lifetime of the certificate. As outlined above, a VOMS proxy certificate is composed of two parts: the user's grid proxy certificate and the VOMS extended key attributes proxy certificate. It is worth noting that the VOMS extended key attribute proxy certificate has a lifetime that is different from the grid proxy certificate; the default lifetime is 12 hours but can be easily modified to be longer (or shorter).
The Grid User Management System (GUMS) [7] , maps grid credentials to site specific credentials. FermiGrid manages its own mapping as do other OSG sites. GUMS periodically polls the VOMS servers and updates its user DN plus extended attributes to local UID mappings database. This happens asynchronously on a 6 hour interval, introducing a possible delay before a grid user is able to execute a job on a batch system. The list of VOMS servers the GUMS server polls is manually configured by a system administrator.
Due to European privacy regulations, it has been discussed amongst the GUMS developers and the European grid security people to modify GUMS to only maintain identity information of users who run on a particular grid Site instead of maintaining a database of everyone in a particular VO, which is the current modus operandi. This enhancement would allow European grids to adopt this technology should they choose to do so.
There are three types of mapping supported by GUMS: many-to-one, one-to-one and one-to-self. In the many-to-one case, all members of the same VO having the same extended key attributes are mapped to a single local UID. In the OSG the many-to-one mapping is an acceptable usage case, however, in the European grids it is not, due to the same privacy regulations mentioned above: with many-to-one mappings it is possible to obtain the proxy of another user running on the same batch system. Currently, the OSG prevents this through policies set in the Acceptable Usage Policy (AUP) document that all OSG users must electronically sign when they register with their VO. In the one-toone usage case, a set of pool accounts is created on the batch system and GUMS maps a user DN with extended key attributes to a single, specific pool account. This mapping will be maintained in the GUMS database so that each consecutive request for mapping from that user using that specific set of extended key attributes will result in being mapped to the same pool account UID at that site (i.e., DN="Dan Yocum"+VO=cms/Role=cmsuser always maps to uscms03 on FermiGrid worker nodes). The advantages of the one-to-one method enhance security by protecting the user's data and environment. One-to-one mapping also makes it easier to trace a rogue job in the queue to the originating user. One problem with one-to-one mapping is that it is the responsibility of the Site system administrator to make sure there are enough pool accounts available on each worker node (WN) in the batch system. The last type of mapping is one-to-self. As the name suggests, a user is mapped to her own local UID on the batch system. This mapping mechanism is employed at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL).
The mapping scheme that is used at a Site is a decision of the site administrators based on the request of the VO using the site. For instance, CMS has requested that users be mapped one-to-one on FermiGrid, while D-Zero is using the many-to-one mapping. `
The scalability of the GUMS server has been remarkable. The hardware system, like all the FermiGrid critical systems, is comprised of a dual 3.06GHz Intel XEON with 4GB of PC2100 DDRAM, 2 mirrored 10K rpm SCSI system disks and a single gigabit ethernet connection to the LAN. GUMS is implemented as a Java Servlet and runs in Tomcat. The server is able to sustain a load of 450,000 mapping requests per day (5.2 mappings per second) with an average system load (1 minute) of about 2-3. It is anticipated that the system will easily be able to accommodate CMS production when the mapping requests will increase to >20Hz.
FermiGrid user authorization includes communications with the the Fermi Site Authorization Service (SAZ). SAZ allows security authorities of FermiGrid to impose a site-wide grid access policy based on user DN, VO membership or Certificate Authority. Registration with SAZ is automatic and transparent when a grid user first runs a job on FermiGrid and the user's DN and VO affiliation is entered into its database. The default policy is to allow access to users who present a valid and trusted VOMS proxy certificate. On a case-by-case basis, users can be allowed access to FermiGrid resources with valid non-extended grid credentials. Using SAZ's blacklist functionality, Site administrators have the ability, to prevent unauthorized access to compute and storage resources if it has been determined that a user's DN has been stolen or is untrusted. SAZ gives a very fine-grain user access control in a very short period of time instead of the hours, if not days, required to remove a user from a VOMS server, then wait for the change to propagate through to the GUMS server.
Running Jobs
The FermiGrid resources are organized in several semi-independent pools of resources. Each pool has its own Globus gatekeeper and its own access policies, but the user mapping and authorization policies for all of them are handled by a central GUMS and SAZ service, resulting in a uniform mapping across all the resources. Each pool runs a gLite CEMon information system [9] , advertising its own resource characteristics to a semi-central web services-enabled information repository. Resources are described via the Glue Schema and this information is represented by sets of ClassAds [12] .
To submit to the FermiGrid (Figure 3) , a user invokes voms-proxy-init to create a VOMS proxy certificate and then submits the job to the FermiGrid master gatekeeper, fermigrid.fnal.gov, using the Globus GRAM protocol [3] . Job submission include job-specific resource requirements. When the job reaches the Globus gatekeeper, the SAZ plugin passes the user proxy to the Fermilab Site Authorization (SAZ) service. If the SAZ server authorizes the user, the gatekeeper invokes the GUMS server using the Prima [18] callout service, passing the user's DN and extended key attributes, and obtaining a mapping to a local UID/GID. The user job is then submitted to the local Condor scheduler as a Condor-G job, using the local UID as authentication. The Condor pool is configured to use the Resource Selection Service (ReSS) [8] . Through ReSS, the Condor Match-Making System [10] will match the job's requirements against the resource attributes published by CEMon and forward the job to o ntually executed. FermiGrid uses the MyProxy [13] service as a secure proxy certificate storage service. Using this service, a long running user job can refresh the proxy certificate during the lifetime of the job. The MyProxy service provides a a
Pilot Jobs
In 2005, the Fermilab Computing Division management became aware of a unique use case of our grid compute resources. Termed late binding or Pilot Jobs, these jobs are submitted by a single person, to a set of grid sites where they get queued in the local batch queue as any regular grid job. When the Pilot Job starts execution, it immediately "calls home" to a separate batch queue system at the home institution to obtain the real job, termed the User Job; this way resource matching can be done using the attributes provided by the Pilot Job and the administrators at the home institution can place priorities on their user's jobs independently from the batch queue on the grid compute cluster. These User Jobs are downloaded to the worker nodes and executed using the certificate of the Pilot Job Manager.
Figure 4. Workflow for Pilot Job Submission
ijacked by a hacker). Operating in thi rker nodes, as it can be used to run a User Job nder the appropriate account given a valid user proxy. com ny information is missing, the Collector attempts to find it from other sources (Gram, VOMRS, etc.)
The problem with this scenario is that while the Pilot Job Manager may be authorized to execute a job on the grid, the owner of the User Job may not be (i.e., they may not have valid grid credentials, they may have been blacklisted, or their account may have been h s manner is a violation of Fermilab computer security policies.
To address these problems, work was coordinated with the NIKHEF developers of the gLite glexec [14], a grid-enabled suexec derivative, to integrate their product with SAZ and GUMS. Glexec ( Figure  4 ) can be thought of as a mini-gatekeeper running on wo u
Job Accounting
For accounting purposes FermiGrid relies on Gratia [15] . The Gratia accounting system is designed to be a robust, scalable, and accurate grid accounting service. Gratia's main function is to accurately and pletely report the usage of the various Grid Services, focusing first on batch and storage services. Gratia uses service probes which gather usage information ( Figure 5 ) about specific services and upload this information to a server called the Gratia Collector. For instance, the current implementation of the Gratia Condor Probe looks at the existing Condor log file and reports the amount of CPU time used by each job. However, instead of parsing log files, a more direct approach is encouraged. For example, the glexec Gratia Probe is called directly by glexec at the end of each job, reporting the relevant information. Upon receiving the upload from the Gratia Probe, the Gratia Collector checks that all the information needed is included. If a
Figure 5. Gratia Usage For FermiGrid + Other OSG Sites
OSG is currently deploying the Gratia Collector and Reporting Services on a single central server, located at Fermilab. In future releases, the collector and reporter will also be installed at each OSG Site.
To date, Gratia Probes have been developed for Condor, PBS, LSF, Sun Grid Engine, glexec, and dCache. These probes have been deployed both via RPMs, distributed from the OSG web site, and via the Virtual Data Toolkit (VDT) cache.
User Disk Space and Mass Storage
FermiGrid supplies shared data storage and access services to user jobs, providing two pools of data storage for general usage. The first is 14TB of disk space, served by an NFS server appliance for grid users to install software, stage input data, and write output data. This space is mounted on most of the worker nodes and uses quotas to restrict the amount of storage accessible to a user. In addition to this NFS disk, there is 6TB of disk spread across 5 storage servers. This disk is managed by the dCache system and does not use quotas but implements a least recently used cache management policy. The external interface to this storage resource is either direct via gridftp or by utilizing the Storage Resource Manager (SRM) [16] interface. SRM provides dynamic space allocation and file management functionality on local and remote data storage systems, using grid credentials for data access.
The FermiGrid dCache uses gPlazma [17] to interface to the GUMS service to map user DNs to local UIDs for file ownerships. The same DN to UID mapping schemes described earlier are available here: many-to-one, one-to-one and one-to-self. It should be noted again that in the many-to-one mapping, all members of the VO have access to all data written by other members of the same VO and data can be easily shared between members of the same VO. The same is true of the one-to-one mapping scheme if the owner of the file enables group read permissions.
Authorized users may have access from their jobs to the Fermilab tape storage system. In general, VOs not directly associated with Fermilab do not have access to the tape backed storage areas; however, upon special request this can be arranged.
FermiGrid provides a set of standard data locations referenced by environment variables so that users can access their data and applications in a consistent manner. The same is true for all OSG sites.
FermiGrid does not supply any tools for aiding the user in management of data collections. 
Worker Nodes

VO Job Submissions for the Week of Feb 5-12, 2007
Site Name VO sum FermiGrid is in the process of commissioning High Availability Services for the Site Globus Gatekeeper, VOMS, GUMS, and SAZ, and vobox/edge services using High Availability Linux and ensive operational metrics and service monitor infrastructure, which collects and publishes information for the underlying Grid middleware services.
The metrics collection occurs once a day and collects information for the previous day. The service monitors run multiple times per day (typically once per hour) and gather detailed information about the service that they are monitoring. The service m t they are monitoring (together with any dependent services), notify administrators if problems are detected and are instrumented to automatically restart the service(s) as necessary to insure continuous availability. 
Future Work m
(WMS) and job p transport, where the endpoints must be secure, but the intermediate services may not be. However, unlike the secure email scenario, the final destination is not known at submission time, so Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) cannot be used for the encryption needed to protect the proxy used by the job at runtime. Epensys addresses the problem by requiring the use of a symmetri ring the key in a Grid-central key store service. Moreover, since the intermediate services cannot be trusted, a very limited proxy, useful for user authentication and the running of the specific job only, is used in place of the full user proxy at submission time. After the payload reaches a trusted worker node, the symmetric key will be accessed by presenting both the limited proxy and the host certificate.
Balancing the needs of our robust, shared job grid with those of a data grid will be necessary for the demands of both LHC experiments and the ever increasing number of OSG VOs. Work to support this will need to be addressed in the forthcoming year.
Xe ob submissions and our GUMS server performs hundreds of thousands of user mapping authorizations, and authorizes the transfer of hundreds of terabytes of data in and out of the Fermilab Mass Storage me is over 99% and the plans to make the system Highly Available will increase that n virtualization technologies. These technologies will implement Active-Active (VOMS, GUMS, SAZ) or Active-Standby (Gatekeeper, Condor Negotiator, Info Gatherer) depending on the service.
Conclusion
FermiGrid is a well designed and deployed, robust grid gateway system based on standard grid software and interfaces. On an average day our gatekeepers accept tens of thousands of j System. Our upti reliability.
